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Temporalities of Emergent Axiomatic Violence in Brexit
Scotland
Gabriela Manley
Social Anthropology, University of St Andrews, St Andrews, UK
ABSTRACT
Following an acrimonious referendum on European Union
membership, the UK was plunged into chaos as people
attempted to negotiate a deeply divided domestic political
landscape. In Scotland, things were further complicated by the
independence question and the Scottish National Party’s (SNP)
call for a second independence referendum. In light of the Brexit
result, since 2016 many citizens of Scotland have re-thought their
position on independence owing to emergent axiomatic violence
located in the UK’s split from Europe. This article examines the
different temporalities involved with the emergent axiomatic
violence of Brexit as experienced in Scotland. For those who once
supported the Union, Brexit is understood as a moment of violent
and unforeseen rupture, emerging from a one-off event in the
present. In contrast, nationalists speak of Brexit as representative
of the accretive slow violence brought on through historical
imbalances in UK politics; Brexit was to be expected, emerging
from long-term processes. For EU migrants, the violence of Brexit
is built into their futures, as they contemplate work and family
life in a drastically changed socio-political landscape. Although
the ‘emergent’ aspect of the violence inherent in Brexit is
dependent on perspective, all agree that the violence is





The 2016 United Kingdom European Union membership referendum – commonly
referred to as the ‘Brexit referendum’ – saw the UK vote 52% to 48% to leave the Euro-
pean Union. The result was received across much of the UK with unadulterated shock,
perceived by many as a form of rupture which tore away European, cosmopolitan futures
to reveal an isolationist, right-wing culture many could not identify with. The immediate
aftermath of the vote also brought with it a continued heightened feeling of violence
across the UK, in particular towards EU migrants who saw a significant spike in racist
and xenophobic attacks (Reed-Danahay 2020; Guma and Jones 2019) increasing
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animosity between many ‘remainers’ (who voted to stay in the EU) and ‘leavers’ (who
voted to withdraw) who found their differences irreconcilable.
The Brexit ballot encapsulated much more than the simple binary question presented
to voters on European Union membership; it was a vote on the identity of the UK as a
nation, and how it was to be perceived in relation to global political and social move-
ments in the future. It was a vote against the cosmopolitan, pro-immigration multi-cul-
turalism that had defined the UK since the post-war years (Knight 2017; Franklin 2019)
and was commonly believed to be driven by the rise of right-wing populism across the
country; a cry of pain from those suffering at the hands of neoliberal Westminster pol-
icies (Rapport 2020). Immigrants were scapegoated, stereotyped, and abused whilst right-
wing personalities rose in popularity on the back of an alternative vision of the UK rooted
in nostalgic imperialism and anti-immigration sentiments that sought to ‘free’ the UK
from Europe’s ‘liberal elite’. In this way, Brexit was not only a political vote on European
Union policies, it was an identity protest vote driven by feelings of cultural and historical
loss (Franklin 2019; Koch 2017).
The significance of the vote meant that across pro-EU media landscapes and anthro-
pological spaces the unexpected Brexit result was discussed as a moment of violent
rupture: a result that brought immediate and sensational visibility to a before and
after in UK politics and public consciousness (Green et al. 2016). ‘With most I am
sharing an injury’ lamented Michael Carrithers in Sarah Green’s edited post-Brexit
forum, ‘We are now a small “we” who have suddenly lost the right to speak among
a much larger “we” beyond the shores of this island’ (Carrithers 2016, 483). This
kind of political rupture is often in itself inherently violent. If the resistance of nation-
alism involves the deconstruction of its claims to essence that hold sway over time and
space, ‘any insistence on essence or attempt to fix an identity smacks of violence’ (Hol-
braad et al. 2019, 6). For most pro-EU voters, then, Brexit was a violent event in the
most traditional of senses, an event that is perceived to be immediate, sudden, ruptur-
ous, marking a before and after characterised by physical, psychological or symbolic
damage (Nixon 2011; Bosi and Malthaner 2015). Three years on from the vote, these
feelings of isolationist, racist and neo-imperialist violence culminated in the election
of Boris Johnson as Prime Minister, a man known for his overtly xenophobic
opinion columns in the right-wing magazine The Spectator. Now, politics in the UK
is said to be more divided than ever, with shifting ‘leave’ and ‘remain’ alliances prom-
ising to change the political landscape for years to come.
In Scotland however, Brexit is perceived along a number of different axes, the
‘remain’ and ‘leave’ politics further complicated by the question of independence and
the civic Scottish National Party’s (SNP) pro-EU stance. Having voted strongly in
favour of remaining in the EU (62%), Scotland now finds itself in the unique position
of having to leave the EU against its will. The SNP, who have put forward a vision of
‘independence in Europe’ since the 1980s, has taken this opportunity to present itself –
and Scottish independence – as the antithesis to Brexit. They have driven a strong cam-
paign for a second independence vote based on Scotland’s Europhile voting pattern,
arguing that independence is now necessary so that ‘Scotland may remain in Europe
as it voted for’.
Following 15 months of fieldwork amongst SNP activists in Edinburgh, I explore here
the ways in which the question of Scottish independence has influenced perceptions of
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Brexit amongst veteran SNP activists, new SNP activists who joined the party post-Brexit,
and European migrants in Edinburgh who recently joined the SNP as a form of resistance
to Brexit. Although they are all now pro-independence supporters to some degree, each
group understands the violence of Brexit with varying urgency and intensity, according
to different temporalities, and influenced by their relationship to Scottish independence
or their migrant status. For those who once supported the Union, Brexit is understood as
a moment of violent and unforeseen rupture, emerging from a one-off event in the
present. In contrast, nationalists speak of Brexit as representative of the accretive slow
violence brought on through historical imbalances in UK politics; Brexit was to be
expected, emerging from long-term processes. For EU migrants, the violence of Brexit
is built into their futures, as they contemplate work and family life in a drastically
changed socio-political landscape. Even though the ‘emergent’ aspect of the violence
inherent in Brexit is dependent on perspective, all agree that they believe it is part of
everyday life for the foreseeable future – that is, that it is axiomatic.
The New Appeal of the SNP
The SNP has long preached pro-EU civic nationalism, aligning itself with other regional
sovereigntist movements whilst emphasising a residency-based definition of Scotland
(Torrance 2017). Since its inception in 1934, the SNP has, to varying degrees, presented
itself as an internationalist (McCrone 2002), pro-European Union (Keating 2001), civic
nationalist (Keating 2009) party, whose primary concern is the democratic imbalance
between England and Scotland rather than the question of ethnic belonging. It has
further been described as a liberal nationalist movement rooted in nineteenth-century
liberal ideals (Hearn 2000). Following its rise to power in the devolved Scottish parlia-
ment in 2007, the referendum on Scottish independence in 2014, and the subsequent
2016 Brexit fallout in the UK, the SNP has taken extreme care to present itself as the
antithesis to right-wing nationalisms that have been resurfacing across Europe, utilising
this contrasting political position as further proof of its commitment to civic- rather than
ethno-nationalism (Virdee and McGeever 2018; Rzepnikowska 2019).
Scottish nationalists have long since believed their parliamentary democratic rights to
be overruled and controlled by the UK government, an argument that has formed the
basis of their brand of civic nationalism for decades (Torrance 2017). Since the re-brand-
ing of the SNP in the 1980s, nationalist arguments for independence have been driven by
the desire for self-determination and a vision of a liberal Scotland in Europe. The argu-
ment presented by them and their membership has been as follows: Scotland wishes to be
a left-wing, liberal nation, yet it is shackled by the right-wing UK Parliament, therefore,
for Scotland to be the country it wishes to be, it must become independent. Of course, the
SNP occupies the somewhat privileged position of holding a third-party status in the UK
and currently opposing a right-wing Conservative government, allowing them to fulfil
the role of protest and opposition. It is yet to be seen whether they could sustain such
an approach if opposing a left-wing government or in the case of independence.1
However, in the current situation their strong pro-EU stance and civic nationalist
visions have never been more publicly appealing than in contrast to Brexit, creating
complex responses amongst its members and those who had once rejected the Scottish
independence project. As one SNP activist told me,
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people are waking up, this whole Brexit thing has exposed the UK for what it is… people
here in Scotland are finally realising that it’s not us that have the nationalism problem…
I welcome new members aye, hard to forgive them for the No vote [in 2014], but now we
can join Europe and be truly European, not half in half out. That’s what Scotland wants.
This strong pro-EU stance that the SNP is now offering as an alternative to Brexit
encouraged voters in Scotland to re-consider their previous anti-independence positions,
with many who previously opposed independence now viewing it as the only escape to
the political violence sparked by Brexit. In contrast, veteran SNP activists I interviewed
and followed on campaigning runs understood Brexit within the context of slow violence
(Nixon 2011), seeing their democratic and social rights eroded over decades, if not cen-
turies. Finally, the SNP’s EU stance has also served many in Scotland not only as an island
of safety from Brexit rhetoric but as a form of resistance towards the violence of antici-
pation (Griffiths 2014), indeterminacy and liminality that occurred between the Brexit
vote and the date the UK was to leave the EU. For many, joining the SNP and actively
campaigning for an independent Scotland in Europe became a form of resistance, a
way of repelling the UK’s anti-EU stance and the stagnation that Brexit liminality had
imposed on them.
Violence of Rupture
From Anti-Independence Activist to SNP Supporters: Remainers and Brexit
On the night of the referendum in 2016, leaving the EU still seemed unlikely – a distant
dream of the Eurosceptic right wing, doomed to falter before the might of the European
status quo. Polls had consistently predicted a pro-EU victory, and everyone in Scotland –
my SNP informants recall – seemed quietly confident. ‘I hadn’t met a single person that
wanted to vote for Brexit’ lamented Ann as we climbed up and down tenement buildings
delivering SNP propaganda through letterboxes for the 2019 European Parliamentary Elec-
tions. She was one of the many middle-aged and middle-class SNP activists in Edinburgh
whohad joined the party theday after theBrexit vote, theunexpected result radically shifting
her previous anti-independence position. She had spent the first half of 2016 campaigning
for the EU where she had found common ground with SNP activists. At the time she had
been surprised by this crossover and the comradery she developed with the SNP who, as a
unionist at the time, she had always considered ‘the enemy in chief’. ‘I can’t believe it
wasn’t the SNP that destroyed us in the end’ she followed, ‘I can’t believe England2 did
this… I can’t believe the vote was allowed’. Much like Ann, throughout their campaigning
in Edinburgh, many SNP activists and pro-EU campaigners alike had encountered little to
no resistance to their unapologetically pro-EUmessaging, often sharing bewildered remarks
with the electorate in the street: ‘howcouldwepossibly leave theEU?’ It seemed that for once,
nationalists and unionists alike had found a cause that united them.
As the cosmopolitan epicentre of Scotland, home to three multinational universities
and the largest European migrant population in the country, it was not surprising to
find such fervent pro-EU support in the streets of Edinburgh. This stood in stark contrast
to other parts of Scotland – particularly the North-East – where EU membership was a
highly contested topic even amongst SNP members.3 Despite this, the feeling of Scottish
pro-EU unity seemed unwavering for my Edinburgh SNP informants who firmly
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believed in Scotland’s commitment to the European cosmopolitan project. This senti-
ment was particularly strong for those I interviewed who had previously supported the
Union before joining the SNP in 2016 as a result of Brexit, most of whom cited their
wish to remain in the EU as their main motivation for voting against independence in
2014. For them, a vote against independence had been a vote in favour of the cosmopo-
litan European project that the UK offered. The flip from this position so clearly offered
to them by the UK only two years earlier seemed inconceivable.
As the first ‘remain’ result rolled in from Gibraltar, the fate of the Brexit project in Scot-
land seemed sealed, with the leader of the pro-Brexit party, Nigel Farage, publicly conceding
defeat on the night of the referendum. To rise the next morning, then, to a successful Brexit
votewas nothing short of a violent rupture in themost traditional ofways: an event ‘immedi-
ate in time, explosive and spectacular in space, erupting into instant sensational visibility’
(Nixon 2011, 2). Waking up to Brexit has been described to me by unionists in Edinburgh
in such immediate and spectacular terms, a moment that marked a radical before and after
punctuated by negative, painful feelings. Unionists in Edinburgh described waking up to
Brexit as ‘life altering’, ‘earth shattering’, ‘incomprehensible’, and above all, ‘traumatic’, a
moment of rupture inwhich the UK’s isolationist and xenophobic inclinations came to sen-
sational visibility for them, shattering the cosmopolitan pro-European consensus they had
assumed to be integral to the identity of the nation (see Knight 2017).
This forceful form of discontinuity that unionists in Scotland experienced on that
fateful morning is deeply entangled with their identity as anti-independence supporters.
Back in 2014, when Scotland held its independence referendum, unionists (who favoured
Scotland remaining part of UK) feared that Scotland leaving the union would mean
leaving the EU, a risk many were not prepared to take. Membership of the EU took
centre stage in the unionist campaign at the time, with unionist parties (Labour and Con-
servatives) arguing that the only way to remain in Europe was to remain in the UK. As a
whole, the Scottish National Party worked hard to emphasise its commitment to the
European project, however, they ultimately failed to reassure pro-European Scots that
Scotland would maintain its EU status after independence, and the referendum was nar-
rowly lost: 45% for independence, 55% against. To the ex-unionists I interviewed, this
had felt like stepping back from the vertiginous cliff edge (Knight 2021, 10), from the
chaos and uncertainty that Scottish independence would have brought. Their European
future secured and the status quo unaltered, they had welcomed the stability that the
unionist campaign had promised them. This, Ann always stressed, was her main motiv-
ation for voting against independence in 2014 and maintaining a strong unionist position
until Brexit. She often discussed this point with both fellow SNP newcomers and those
she encountered during street campaigning that were once staunchly anti-independence
and now found themselves on the fence. Two years after the independence referendum
unionists had once again found themselves at the cliff edge, promises of European mem-
bership and stability taken away by the very politicians who had preached them; Scotland
– that voted 62% in favour of remaining in the EU – left Europe against its will after all.
‘Do you feel betrayed?’ I asked an ex-unionist who approached the SNP street stall Ann
and I were in charge of during the 2019 general election, ‘I feel lost’ they replied, ‘the
country I thought I lived in no longer exists…maybe it never did’.
The emergent axiom of violence being discussed here is one of rupture, born from a
destabilisation of social knowledge through a crisis of social judgement (Roitman 2013),
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in which time is rendered plural and kaleidoscopic – ‘possible futures running back to
reconsidered pasts’ and destabilising the imagined community of the nation (Greenhouse
2019, 71). For my informants, this meant that the future of an isolationist, xenophobic
nation that Brexit Britain offered left them having to reconsider their past support for
independence, as well as their previous identity as British rather than Scottish, turning
Brexit into a highly personal crisis encompassing political beliefs and identity politics.
This disconnect is one that echoed with many unionists. To them, the moment of
Brexit constituted the brutal form of discontinuity that sudden political rupture brings
with it, whilst simultaneously opening up a space for the transformation of social and
political conceptions (Holbraad et al. 2019). It brought into ‘instant sensational visibility’
the political divides between Scotland and the rest of the UK. The Brexit campaign led by
the far-right UK Independence Party (UKIP), was strongly isolationist, often racist, xeno-
phobic, and hinted at imperialistic nostalgia (Evans 2017). It routinely alluded to the
UK’s past greatness with slogans such as ‘Make Britain Great Again’ and ‘Take Back
Control’. Racist imagery and rhetoric were used to stoke anti-immigration feelings
such as the now infamous Brexit billboard which featured a vast queue of brown male
faces framed by red writing reading ‘Breaking Point’.
For the majority of Scottish unionists who did not identify with this message, it was a
difficult realisation that the country they had deliberately chosen to so strongly identify
themselves with in 2014 had voted for a right-wing Brexit. They found themselves
having to reconsider the position they had so carefully and emotionally taken during
the independence referendum. Their rejection of the isolationist nationalism championed
by the Brexit vote ironically pushed them towards the (Scottish) nationalism they had
rejected only two years prior. Many expressed shock at the implications of Brexit; ‘Oh
god it’s a nightmare’ an ex-unionist stated during an SNP canvassing run. Triggered by
a pro-Boris Johnson poster proudly displayed on a window we had just passed, he lamen-
ted Brexit and the subsequent fallout, despairing, as he saw no way out other than Scottish
independence: ‘like a real nightmare, one that you dream, how is this [Brexit] happening?’.
However, unlike a real nightmare, there is no possibility of waking up fromBrexit and have
the country ‘go back to normal’. Even if Brexit endedupnot going ahead, allmy informants
stressed, the UK would never be the same. Brexit exposed an imperialist and xenophobic
side of the UK that was here to stay. As Madeline Reeves points out ‘the Leave campaign’s
call to “take back control” has given form and solidarity to undercurrents of fear, disillu-
sion and xenophobia that won’t easily now be contained’ (2016, 480). The temporality of
Brexit for unionistswas one of sudden rupture, verymuch a violent ‘event’ thatwas unfore-
seen until the morning the result was announced. Their reaction was overwhelmingly one
of shock and disbelief at being blindsided. However, for other factions of SNP supporters,
Brexit surpassed its event-like status, representing the most recent episode in the long
history of colonial violence administered by Westminster against Scotland.
Slow Violence
Perceptions of Brexit Amongst Veteran SNP Activists
Amongst veteran pro-independence nationalists in Scotland, Brexit was perceived in a
very different light, the axiomatic violence having a longer temporality, emerging to
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the fore with the Brexit vote. It is a state of violence they perceive to be slow and accretive,
its dire repercussions playing out across a large temporal scale (Nixon 2011). For Scottish
nationalists, Brexit brought no rupture, no discontinuity or heightened sense of the
present. Instead, in the immediate aftermath of Brexit the feeling amongst my Edinburgh
informants was one of quiet resentment and exasperation, the air thick with unspoken ‘I-
told-you-so’s’.
SNP supporters have long subscribed to a narrative of internal colonialism in Scot-
land, an understanding of history that drives their visions of nationalism and relation-
ships with Westminster and the rest of the UK. They perceive Scotland to represent
the textbook example of internal colonisation, the Scots being the receivers of ‘discrimi-
nation against culturally distinct peoples who have been forced onto less accessible
inferior lands’ (Hechter 1999, 32) as a result of centuries of British imperial rule. This
is a position my informants would reinforce by citing the recent voting discrepancies
between Scotland and England – the large population of England dictating political out-
comes for the whole of the UK – and by highlighting the ways in which the UK wishes to
continue being an imperial power. These beliefs run deep amongst veteran party activists,
who spent a large amount of time researching historical documents in search for concrete
proof of this internal colonialism.
During my fieldwork, such practices culminated in a pro-independence exhibition set
up by a group of amateur historians who had done extensive research into British mili-
tary posts built in Scotland following the 1707 Acts of Union in which Scotland and
England unified. They called these military posts ‘English settlements’ and marked
them on various maps of Scotland which were displayed alongside information posters
on the ‘British military invasion’. Such were the terms that Dave, one of the amateur his-
torians involved in the creation of the exhibition, used when showing me around. ‘Does
this look like an equal union to you?’ he gestured angrily at the maps,
this is no union, this is an invasion plain and simple, imagine being a peasant and having all
this military around you. There has never been a union, it’s always been an invasion, con-
trolling us from London, it’s the same story as now.
Although Dave did not mean this in the literal sense of current physical and military
invasion, he, and his fellow SNP peers, believed the current Brexit disparities between
England and Scotland, where Scotland was being forced to leave the EU by the
English vote, to be an extension of this forceful invasion they saw in their military
maps: ‘it’s in the head, and in the politics, how they ration our money, and now
Brexit’. The emergent aspect of this axiomatic violence was simply that now, with
Brexit, everyone else would realise that people like Dave were right all along, as the dra-
matic vote brought underlying historical power discrepancies to the fore for all to see.
The validities of these claims of colonisation are still highly contested by historians,
with no consensus reached (see Connell 2004; Jackson and Maley 2002). Those who
agree defend that English imperialist practices were implemented across Scotland, with
lasting consequences today; the highland clearances (Kenrick 2011), the loss of Gaelic,
and ‘English’military bases on Scottish land (Mackinnon 2018) are a few of the examples
commonly cited. SNP supporters take this a step further, arguing that the invisible hand
of British internal colonialism is still at play, permeating all aspects of life. This is most
reminiscent of the banal nationalism described by Billig (1995) where small everyday
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displays of Britishness are understood as coercive colonialist measures (see Herzfeld 2002
on crypto-colonialism).4 From anger at seeing a Union Jack instead of a Saltire printed on
Scottish produce at the supermarket, to Scottish money being viewed with suspicion in
England, or the Union Jack flown at the local council building being bigger than the
Saltire flying next to it – the UK rules Scotland. To them, however, this is nowhere
more obvious than in the perceived democratic imbalance between Scotland and
England, where they believe Scotland to have been ruled by a right-wing, neo-colonial
English political class for decades.
Nationalists in Scotland have historically regardedWestminster as a right-wing strong-
hold and have routinely resented the English for voting-in a Conservative government
Scotland did not want. Scottish nationalists are not wrong in their analysis of historical
voting pattern discrepancies between England and Scotland. The last time Scotland
voted for a Conservative government was in 1955, however, since then they have been
ruled by a Conservative UK government for over 45 years.5 Further, the Conservative gov-
ernments that Scotland did not vote for have historically come accompanied by dire cuts to
social welfare and industry in Scotland. This political disconnect and its socioeconomic
consequences for Scotland slowly inflamed civic-nationalist sentiments north of the
border. Informants within the SNP tell me of being victims of a Parliament they did not
vote for, of feeling governed by a far-away power, of ‘Westminster rule’. Feelings of
despondency and anger are common, their memories of this ‘Westminster rule’ over Scot-
land going back generations. In this way, for SNP activists, democracy has been long dead
in Scotland, with the invisible imperialist hand of the Westminster Parliament chipping
away at their democratic and social powers for decades, if not centuries.
It is this perception of the slow erosion of Scottish powers, history and identity by the
UK government that impacts their perception of Brexit, rendering it in many ways a
‘quasi-event’; an event in which deferral, attrition, accumulation and ordinariness is
their violence (Ahmann 2018; Povinelli 2011). Similarly to Nixon, Berlant tells us that
slow violence refers to a general wearing out, ‘to deterioration as defining condition
of… historical existence’ (2011, 95). Instead of spectacular and instantaneous, its slow
pace decouples consequence from its original cause, making it hard to perceive, and
even harder to point out. In this way, instead of the unionists’ sudden explosive violence
explored above, nationalists see Brexit within a different temporality: as the culmination
of the slow violence of British colonialism and the English right-wing rule they have been
subjected to for centuries.
Axiomatic in its historical and cultural depth, they believe this violence only emerged
into the view of the general population when the ‘English’ vote to leave the EU forced the
hand of the ‘Scottish’ consensus. As such, the axiomatic violence of Brexit is symptomatic
of the ‘now’ moment of 2016 onwards, but with much deeper roots than the one-off
explosive event experienced by Unionists like Ann. The racist, right wing, and nostalgic
empire rhetoric that defined Brexit came as no surprise for nationalists since it forms part
of the slow violence of the British empire. Neither did it come as a shock that Scotland
could vote to remain in the EU and yet be forced to leave as a result of the English (and to
a minor degree Welsh) vote. In this way, amongst my SNP informants who had a long-
term nationalist stance, Brexit was not an event of rupture, but more a particularly strik-
ing example of the issues they have been pointing out for decades, bringing these pro-
blems to the wider public conscience. As such, Brexit was seldom discussed among
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nationalists outside the framework of its implications for Scottish independence. Further,
throughout my fieldwork the idea that something like Brexit would have happened
sooner or later permeated the conversations I had with long-term SNP activists.
In fact, Brexit often discussed by nationalists in a similar way to Joseph Masco’s (2015)
interpretation of the industrial ‘lag’; the inevitable delay between events and their long-
term repercussions inherent in the political process. To them, Brexit was the final explo-
sive consequence of years of Conservative neo-liberal rule; a delayed but direct by-
product of the Thatcherite policies of the 1980s and the nostalgia for the British
empire. I was often told that ‘all you had to do was pay attention [to the politics in
England]’, to know that ‘Brexit had been long coming’. This lag that the rhythm of
slow violence creates often leads to a decoupling of cause and effect, making it difficult
to represent, and even perceive (Ahmann 2018). The resistance to slow violence involves
the identification and exposure of this violence, teaching people to recognise the various
connections between past and present, understanding the numerous minutiae of the
present as part of a larger toxic environment (Murphy 2006). For Scottish nationalists,
this has historically taken on the form of activism, door knocking and campaigning in
spaces where they might hope to expose these patterns to unconvinced unionists.
However, since the Brexit referendum, Scottish nationalists have moved away from
mundane minutiae, using Brexit as the ultimate example of cumulative slow violence
against Scotland. This is the very function of ‘events’ – they make a difference by exposing
the order of things, rupturing the experience of routine (Sahlins 2000, 301).
The ‘eventedness’ of Brexit has materialised nationalist arguments of self-determi-
nation. Instead of alluding at abstract philosophical ideas of democracy, Scottish nation-
alists are now able to point to Brexit as the pinnacle of the democratic and ideological
imbalance between Scotland and the UK as a whole. The axiomatic violence has been
laid bare for all to see. The SNP are using Brexit to demonstrate these imbalances, not
because it has presented a new perspective, but because it so strikingly exposes an old one.
Unlike the traumatic rupture that unionists experienced, then, the Scottish national-
ists approached Brexit as what Ahmann (2018, 159) coins a moral punctuation: ‘A
specific marking of time that condenses protracted suffering and demands an ethical
response eschewing the delays of political caution and the painstaking work of ensuring
scientific certainty’. In the case of Brexit, the ethical demand being that of immediate
Independence for Scotland, so that Scotland may remain in the EU as it has voted for.
Brushing aside accusations of opportunism, the right wing, neo-imperialist politics of
Brexit continue to be contested by the SNP, who offer a vision of Scotland as European,
green, and socialist. They utilise their version of civic-nationalism as a tool for resistance
towards more traditional right-wing nationalisms brewing in the UK, arguing that the
only way to be truly pro-European and left-wing is now through independence.
The Violence in Waiting
Navigating Post-Brexit Britain: EU Migrants and SNP Activists
During my fieldwork, three years on from the Brexit vote, feelings of violent rupture
shifted amongst unionists and remainers, replaced by a permanent state of anticipation
as the UK continued to hover in the liminal threshold between the Brexit vote (2016) and
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the Brexit date (2020). The political turmoil and unprecedented legal battles that followed
the Brexit referendum result meant that the deadline to leave the EU was repeatedly
delayed – from the original date of the 29th of March 2019 to the 12th of April 2019,
the 31st of October 2019 and finally the 31st of January 2020, stretching ever further
the timespace of liminality. During these months, momentum behind ‘remain’ cam-
paigns such as the People’s Vote – who demanded a second referendum on the EU – dee-
pened the feeling of uncertainty in my informants, both new and old SNP activists, who
clinged to the faint glimmer of hope that Brexit would simply be ‘cancelled’. Conversely,
such public movements resulted in a harder line towards Brexit being taken up by the
government and increased the unrest and hostility felt by those who had voted to
leave the EU who were anxious to ‘get Brexit done’.
This ever-extending liminal period marked by deep uncertainty and increasing hosti-
lities towards EU migrants and remainers alike (Closs-Stephens 2016; Owen 2018)
sparked a sense of anxiety for my SNP activists. As Boris Johnson gained popularity
and the idea of an anti-immigration, hard-line ‘no deal’ Brexit gained traction, many
began anticipating apocalyptic outcomes to Brexit. They imagined a country ruled by
lawlessness and chaos, cut off from the world and left wanting for the most basic of
needs, its citizens left fighting over commodities such as food, water and healthcare.
Sitting at a coffee shop in Edinburgh I discussed such preparations with Alan, who
had joined the SNP post-Brexit vote after some persuasion from Ann, with whom he
shared an urgent and apocalyptic fear of the Brexit date. He was showing me a photo-
graph of what looked to have once been a bedroom. Now, it held hundreds of boxes,
piled high on each other, precariously balanced on every surface available, the floor no
longer visible. ‘Is that all food?’ I asked incredulously. He looked at me with an
amused twinkle in his eye ‘Aye food, and the last thing people think about – but the
first thing they miss… toilet paper!’. He is one of the many citizens who seriously
worried about the ever-growing prospect of a ‘no deal’ Brexit, believing all trade of
goods would immediately cease on the day the UK left the EU, leaving the UK ‘as if
under siege, people will be fighting for food!… they will deploy the army… it will be
apocalyptic,’ he concluded. Alan was not alone in his anticipation of violence, both
from the state and disorderly citizens, on ‘Brexit day’, stoked by rumours at the time
that the government would have the army on standby to prevent riots and civil unrest
(BBC 2019). Collective anticipation of this apocalyptic horizon spread, resulting in
numerous businesses selling ‘Brexit survival kits’ comprising of basic foods, a water
filter and a fire starter kit, painting a rather apocalyptic image of a ‘post-Brexit
Britain’. As an SNP Edinburgh councillor put it to me at one of our local SNP
monthly meetings: ‘We are doomed if we do [Brexit] and we are doomed if we don’t’,
referring to the widespread belief that violence would break out whether Brexit happened
or not.
The anticipation of violence was particularly salient amongst European migrants
living in Scotland, whose future had become deeply uncertain.6 Unsure whether they
would be allowed to remain post-Brexit, many put their whole lives on hold, stagnated,
waiting for some clarity on the future that would allow them to act. After years of
being denied a guarantee to remain in the UK after Brexit, and politicians accusing
the government of employing ‘inhumane’ tactics to use migrant rights as ‘hostages’
in the Brexit negotiations (Brooks and Severin 2016; Reed-Danahay 2020) many EU
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migrants began anticipating mass deportations taking place after Brexit, their right to
remain in the UK instantly revoked. Ana, a schoolteacher and French EU migrant from
Edinburgh who joined the SNP post-Brexit doesn’t know what a Brexit nation will look
like, but she knows it will be violent for people like her. She talked, dismayed, about
her contract not being renewed, as her school feared she wouldn’t be able to work
after 31 October 2019 (the Brexit date at the time, this date was later extended to
31 January 2020). She talked of cancelling her Christmas holiday abroad as she
feared she would not be allowed to return to the UK, and now avoids speaking
French in public transport, fearing ethnic discrimination and attacks. The constant
anticipation of xenophobia both from those around her who voted for Brexit and
from the government implementing it left her, and others, feeling like she suddenly
lived in a hostile environment in which she must modify her behaviour to survive, a
feeling shared by EU migrants across the UK (Reed-Danahay 2020). The violence
after the event is elongated, stretching into all perceptions of the future. Both emergent
and axiomatic, the violence of Brexit is directly impacting how people like Ana plan
their lives.
This collective anticipation of an apocalyptic end had been slowly building since 2016
and thrived in the seemingly ever-expanding threshold of Brexit negotiations. Although
the triggering of article 50 (the UK’s formal withdrawal request to the EU) happened with
surprising speed, the country since then seemed stagnated, suspended in the liminal
period of negotiation. It was neither in the EU nor out, and the Brexit deadline for
exiting the EU had been repeatedly pushed back due to numerous political impasses
unprecedented in modern UK history. This meant that some people, particularly EU
migrants, developed a deep sense of elongated crisis. All of my informants felt stuck,
paralysed by the uncertainty and ‘not knowing’ the future. At a time of such uncertainty,
‘we acquire a sense that what we do in this present will be decisive for both the past and
the future, giving to the present the status of a threshold’ (Bryant 2016, 20). When col-
lective, this liminal period takes on the quality of a shared experienced time; a ‘Time of
Brexit’ (Knight 2017) punctuated by its disposition of violence, anticipation, and uncer-
tainty. Much like Hobbes’ ‘time of war’, which he defines as ‘times of immediacy and of a
known disposition to fight, even if no actual clash takes place’ (Bryant and Knight 2019,
30; see also Hobbes 1962), a ‘Time of Brexit’, is an epoch that can be defined not simply
by the violence that occurs during it, but by the very anticipation of it as it builds in these
periods of transition, creating a ‘mounting sense of danger and suspense’ characteristic of
Turner’s periods of crisis (Reed-Danahay 2020).
Mainly, however, migrants talked about the exhaustion of waiting to know their future
in the UK. Waiting through uncertainty constitutes a sense of ‘social entrapment’ (Cra-
panzano 1985) which renders people unable to envision themselves and their futures,
leaving people feeling beaten down and overpowered in what Luhrmann (2006)
described as ‘social defeat’. Being made to wait is ‘inextricably bound up in power
relations and is associated with bureaucratic domination’, where occasional glimmers
of hope for eventual change form part of the technique of control (Griffiths 2014,
1996). Much like asylum seekers in the US, EU migrants in Scotland reported experien-
cing this ‘Time of Brexit’ as a state of ‘existential limbo’ (Haas 2017) in which they were
neither citizens of the UK, nor illegal migrants, powerless to do nothing but wait for this
liminal period to end, one way or another. Forced into living with a ‘dual uncertainty of
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time’ in which change is both imminent and absent (Griffiths 2014, 1) recurring glim-
mers of hope for certainty of their futures – be it from the People’s Vote campaign or
a Brexit deal – kept them in temporal suspension, actively waiting for change. This
process of an unending transformation, of a limbo with no end, created a state of perpe-
tual liminality where the lack of a clear ‘leading out’ path toward an endpoint resulted in
feelings of crisis and chaos (Szakolczai 2000; Laurie 2018).
This sense of perpetual liminality left migrants trapped in what Griffiths (2014) calls
‘directionless stasis’, a state that is debilitating (Rainbird 2014) inciting fatigue, demoti-
vation, anger and even feelings of torture and cruelty (Haas 2017). Many SNP-supporting
migrants I interviewed in Edinburgh spoke of the cruelty of waiting for Brexit; ‘I’m just so
exhausted’ and ‘I just want it to stop’ are pleas that were made with increasing frequency
as the period of waiting increased. During one such interview I asked a Spanish migrant
that I had met at a monthly SNP activist meeting how he felt about his wait being
extended after the Brexit date was pushed back a second time. Taking a shaky breath,
he reflected: ‘I don’t think I can do it… I don’t think I can take it any longer, it’s too
much’. For him, as for many others, living in a state of limbo is made painful not only
because of the precarious condition it represents, but because of the perceived lack of per-
sonal control over the situation. Further, not only was the uncertainty of this extended
liminal period paralysing and exhausting, it was punctuated by an ever-growing fear
of what the future might bring, and the possibility of a ‘no deal’ Brexit. With Boris
Johnson eventually elected as UK prime minister in 2019, many EU migrants fear that
racism is at their door. A man known to have called French people ‘turds’, likened
women wearing burkas to ‘letterboxes’ and referred to black people as having ‘waterme-
lon smiles’, Boris Johnson championed the hardest of Brexits, leaving all SNP activists, to
one extent or another, anticipating a future of prejudice where EU migrants were not
only unwelcome, but actively discriminated against.
Looking for a way to break free from this stagnating period of liminal waiting, many –
both EU migrants and ex-unionists who voted to remain a part of the UK in 2014 –
joined the SNP as a form of resistance. The number of EUmigrants at local SNPmeetings
has noticeably increased since 2016, most of them citing Brexit and the SNP’s response to
it as the main incentive to join. They often talked about ‘fighting back’ and finding refuge
in Scotland from the ‘madness down below’ (in England). Some of these newcomers to
the party were English nationals who very consciously described themselves as ‘political
refugees’, deliberately migrating to Scotland and joining the SNP because of its ‘sensible
approach to Brexit’. For most, it is the act of purposefully campaigning against Brexit and
for independence that allows them to feel like they have regained some control and
agency in this ‘Time of Brexit’.
Conclusion
In Brexit Britain there are three distinct yet interconnected forms of emergent axiomatic
violence, dependant on perspective, each with their own temporal pivot. In all cases, the
impact of ‘Brexit time’ on Scottish politics and the positioning of the SNP has been clear.
As people deal with unprecedented change in their daily lives, leaving the EU has once
again brought the possibility of Scottish independence into frontline politics. The right
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wing, isolationist and often racist and xenophobic rhetoric associated with Brexit has left
many in Scotland re-considering their previous unionist positions from 2014.
In the view of ex-unionists in Scotland, Brexit represents a sudden rupture, an explo-
sive and unexpected event that emerged unsighted from left-field to wreck their long-
held perceptions of life in the UK. As such, the violence emerges from present concerns,
it is of the here-and-now. For them, Brexit is being lived as an explosive exposure of a UK
they did not believe to exist, a Britain that is isolationist and inward-looking rather than
pro-European and cosmopolitan. The establishment of Brexit as the ‘new normal’ in
British politics has caused a re-alignment of political values in Scotland amongst many
who voted against independence but now see the Brexit fallout as embedded in emergent
axiomatic violence in British politics against liberal values and immigrant lives. Having
been promised a stable future in the EU if they voted against independence in 2014, the
sudden disappearance of that future which had seemed sealed was a drastic form of dis-
continuity, best characterised as violent rupture. The traumatic descriptions of my infor-
mants waking up to a ‘Brexit Britain’ are illustrative of the painful tearing of the social
imaginary experienced by unionists.
In contrast, for nationalists, the axiomatic violence has deep historical roots, emerging
to the front of wider public consciousness with the Brexit vote. For veteran SNP activists,
who have been decrying the democratic imbalance between Scotland and the rest of the
UK, Scotland having to leave the EU alongside the rest of the UK even though it strongly
voted to remain is not surprising, but simply shines a spotlight on deep historical con-
cerns. To them, the ‘emergent’ violence of Brexit is the washing away of superficial prom-
ises of equality offered by Westminster to reveal the centuries of slow violence imposed
on them by the ‘colonial British state’, as SNP activists would say.
Finally, EU migrants living in the UK project the violence forward into their future
plans for work and family. In the gap between Brexit vote and actually leaving the EU,
migrants experienced the violence of anticipation, which has become a permanent
state for many foreigners planning their stay on British shores.
It would be easy to gloss political schisms such as Brexit as one event giving way to
‘emergent axiomatic violence’ in the singular. However, as my work with SNP activists
reveals, the interpretation of the violent nature of the political moment is multifaceted,
with different temporal depths and rhythms. Dependant on perspective, axiomatic vio-
lence may emerge from the event to take people by complete surprise, rocking their
life-worlds as explosive rupture; alternatively, the emergence may be seen as the cul-
mination of decades, if not centuries, of slow violence eroding away at the social
fabric. Further, many SNP activists now share the outlook of the most recent party
members, the disenfranchised EU citizens, in experiencing axiomatic violence as struc-
turally embedded in how they anticipate shared futures of Scotland within Brexit
Britain.
Notes
1. Their relationship with the New Labour government (1997–2010) was fraught, with most
SNP members claiming that the New Labour government was not truly left-wing, a position
they felt was reinforced following New Labour’s support for the Iraq War which triggered a
mass exodus of members from Scottish Labour. Many defected to the SNP.
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2. The large population in England and its overall pro-Brexit stance strongly swayed the overall
UK result towards leaving the EU. Because of this, many of my informants blamed England
specifically for Brexit, a narrative that played well into the SNP’s stance on the democratic
imbalances between England, Scotland, and the rest of the UK. SNP activists often flipped
between the terms ‘England’, ‘Westminster’ and ‘Britain’, which they used interchangeably.
SNP activists argue that given the huge sway the English vote has over the rest of UK politics,
it is accurate to equate Westminster, English, and British politics.
3. Internal polling carried out by the SNP immediately after the Brexit referendum indicated
that up to 30% of SNP members had voted to leave the EU – most of these votes coming
from the North and North-East of Scotland. 2018 internal polling regarding Scotland re-
joining the EU as an independent country was met with a much lower 12% disapproval
of the EU, an indication that in-party rumours I often heard my activist informants voice
of members tactically voting for Brexit in order to destabilise the UK were – at least in
part – true.
4. Of course, as Laura Cram (2001) points out, banal Europeanism is also extensively used by
states such as Scotland and in particular political parties like the SNP who frame news about
the EU as ‘home news’, and claims to speak with a European voice that is naturalised
through media, funding, elections and discourse.
5. It is worth noting that although this is the case when looking at the British first past the post
system, in terms of percentage of votes the total conservative votes exceeded the total left-
wing votes in 1959.
6. At the time of writing (February 2020), migrant futures in the UK still remain deeply uncer-
tain, with many having been denied ‘settled status’ in the UK, whilst many others worry they
will not meet the new ‘points based’ criteria being introduced by the government.
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